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Abstract
This paper empirically evaluates whether government ideology and electoral motives influenced
the growth of public health expenditures in 18 OECD countries over the 1971-2004 period. The
results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public
health expenditures in election years. Government ideology did not have an influence. These
findings indicate (1) the importance of public health in policydebates before elections and (2) the
political pressure towards re-organizing public health policy platforms especially in times of
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1. Introduction 
Inmodern economies, the health sector plays a central role in social policy, and the health
policy responsibilities are correspondingly extensive. Politicians design the health insurance
system, subsidize hospitals, regulate the pharmaceutical market, etc. So far only a few studies
examined the political economy aspects of health policy. Scholars have, however, frequently
analyzed the influence of political determinants on overall social expenditures (e.g., Iversen 2001,
Kittel and Obinger 2003, Dreher 2006a, Potrafke 2009a). The empirical results suggest, among
others, that leftist governments increased overall social spending till the end of the 1980s; but this
partisan effect disappeared in the 1990s. Decomposing social expenditures and focusing on
subcategories such as health expenditures in order to identify compensating effects thus emerges
as a worthwhile endeavor. Schmidt (1999) concludes from an analysis of OECD countries that
the influence of government ideology on health is weaker than in other fields of social policy
because health is a particularly important and special good. The demographic change and rising
inequality have, however, contributed to health policy becoming a more polarizing issue. In
particular, the question of inter- and intragenerational redistribution has become significant in
developed countries. As a consequence, the political parties need to adjust their platforms and
policies, and self-interested incumbents maywell consider whether to use the keen public interest
in health policy to improve their re-election prospects by increasing health expenditures before
elections.
Health care expenditures (HCE) have steadily risen in OECD countries and have
therefore attracted a great deal of attention in the political discourse and in the scientific debate.
The cause of this increase in expenditures remains somewhat unclear (for surveys of the literature
see Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000 and Okunade et al. 2004). Three strands of the literature can be
distinguished. The first strand identifies a positive correlation between HCE and GDP growth in
OECD countries and shows that GDP explains a high percentage of the variation of HCE (e. g.
Newhouse 1977, Parkin et al. 1987, Gerdtham and Jönsson 1991, Gerdtham et al. 1992, Hitiris
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and Posnett 1992, also Leu 1986, Culyer 1989). The second strand refines the econometric
techniques and tests for panel unit roots, cointegration and structural breaks etc. (e. g. Hansen
and King 1996, 1998, McCoskey and Selden 1998, Carrion-i-Silvestre 2005, Jewell et al. 2003,
Narayan 2006, Herwartz and Theilen 2003). Introducing the third strand of literature, Gerdtham
and Jönsson (2000) encourage testing for “new” explanatory variables. For example, Baumol’s
(1967) growth model of ‘unbalanced growth’ implies that HCE is driven by wage increases that
exceed productivity growth (Hartwig 2008). The relative price of medical care offers a ready
explanation for the rise in HCE in OECD countries (Hartwig 2010). The lion’s share of total
HCE is public, implying that political factors could also play an important role in explaining the
steadyincrease in HCE.
In this paper, I empirically evaluate how political forces influence the growth of public
HCE. The results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunisticallyand increased the growth of
public health expenditures in election years. Government ideology did not have an influence.
These findings indicate (1) the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and
(2) the political pressure towards re-organizing public health policy platforms especially in times
of demographic change.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical background (political
business cycles, the partisan approach and the role of government in health policies) and derives
the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the data and specifies the empirical model.
Section 4 reports the regression results, investigates their robustness and discusses their
implications. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Political business cycles, partisan approach and government types 
The political business cycle approaches and the partisan theory explain how politicians
influence macroeconomic outcomes. One implication of the political business cycle theories is
that all incumbent politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before
elections. In other words, political ideology retires to the background, and policies converge. The
theories on political business cycles either assume adaptive (Nordhaus 1975) or rational
expectations (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990) of economic actors. In the traditional
approaches with adaptive expectations, opportunistic policymakers can take advantage of an
exploitable Phillips curve trade-off. Opportunistic policymakers can fool the naive voters and
stimulate the economy immediately before each election. In the approaches with rational
expectations, informational asymmetries between politicians and voters take center stage in
explaining electoral cycles. The incumbent exploits his information advantage to signal his
economic competence before elections. The distinction in traditional and rational political
business cycle approaches does not affect the final result of boosting the economy by use of
expansionaryfiscal and monetarypolicies before elections for electoral reasons. Shi and Svensson
(2006) develop a moral hazard model of political competition and show that politicians may
behave opportunistically even if most voters know the government’s policy, but some voters are
uninformed. The more voters (ex ante) fail to distinguish pre-electoral manipulations from
incumbent competence, the more the incumbent profits from boosting expenditures before an
election. Alt and Lassen (2006) point out that the higher the transparencyof the political process,
the lower the probabilitythat politicians behave opportunistically.
The partisan approach, on the other hand, focuses on the influence of party ideology and
shows to what extent leftwing and rightwing politicians will provide policies that reflect the
preferences of their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes
expansionary policies, whereas the rightwing party appeals more to capital owners, and is
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thereforemore concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan
theory - the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) and the rational expectations approach (Alesina
1987).2 For a surveyof the literature see, for example, Alesina et al. (1997).3
Coalition governments have different spending preferences than single party
governments. Government expenditures are expected to be higher the more parties form the
government because decision costs increase with the number of decision makers (“common pool
problem” see, for example, Weingast et al. 1981 and the early veto player theory by Tsebelis
1995). Most recent applications of the veto player theory point out that policy stability increases
with the number of veto players, i.e. coalition partners (Tsebelis 2002). Overall, the influence of
coalition size on government spending remains an empirical matter. As coalition partners need to
reach agreements on howto spend the tax revenue, the type of government (number of coalition
partners, majority versus minority government) is likely to also influence government
expenditures.
 
2.2 The role of government in health policies 
Theoretical political economy approaches to health policy have so far not addressed the
influence of electoral motives and government ideology; they rather deal with the design of
health insurance systems and their financing (see e.g., Breyer 1995, Breyer and Haufler 2000,
Kifmann 2005, Breyer et al. 2009). Formal models that explain the interaction of politicians, their
party ideologies, elections, coalition governments and health policy do not appear to exist. Many
scholars, however, illustrate the role of government in health policies and the model by De
Donder and Hindricks (2007) portrays the interaction of a leftist and a rightwing party in
designing a social insurance system.
                                                                        
2
 For combinations of the political business cycle and the partisan approaches in empirical studies see, for example,
Freyand Schneider (1978a, 1978b). 
3
 For recent empirical studies on political business cycles and partisan cycles see, for example, Vergne (2009) and
Potrafke (2011).
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Immergut(1992) describes howpoliticians implement different health policies and comes
to the following conclusion: “National health insurance symbolizes the great divide between
liberalism and socialism, between the free market and the planned economy….Political parties
look to national health insurance programs as a vivid expression of their distinctive ideological
profiles and as an effective means of getting votes…National health insurance, in sum, is a highly
politicized issue” (Immergut 1992: 1). She provides a comprehensive scheme of the role of
government in health policies and divides the role of government into that of a payer, regulator,
owner and employer. The government gives subsidies to private organizations or levies payroll
taxes to pay for public HCE.4 Government regulation affects insurers, patients, doctors and
hospitals. The public sector also functions as an employer, for example, in hospitals. Poterba
(1995) distinguishes between three possible instruments in health policy: price subsidies,
government mandates, and public provision. As compared to subsidies, mandates do not affect
the government’s budget, whereas public provision gives governments greater control over the
provided services, but maycause inefficiencies due to the monopolistic supply.
In line with the partisan approach, leftist governments are expected to increase the role of
government in health policy. De Donder and Hindricks (2007) examine the political economy of
social insurance policy and demonstrate that in a two party model, the leftwing party proposes
more social insurance than the rightwing party. The rightwing party attracts the richer voters, and
voters with smaller health risks, and the leftwing party attracts the poorer voters, and voters with
higher health risks.
Institutions also influence governments’ health policy. In particular, interest group
activities influence political decisions. These veto players restrict the politicians’ room to
maneuver, but governing parties and their respective networks are able to conduct staffing
policies which influence the veto players in favor of the government’s interests. A further
potential concern occurs in federal states if counties have certain policy responsibilities (for
                                                                        
4
 Immergut (1992: 42 ff.) distinguishes between three kinds of programs: mutual fund subsidies, national health
insurance and national health service.
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exampleregarding hospitals). The federal governments, however, are able to affect decisions in
the counties by, for example, negotiating or determining global budgets for hospitals and general
subsidy levels etc. On the whole, the most important health policy responsibilities such as
designing health insurance remain with the federal governments.
Overall, I expect that incumbents will increase the growth of public health expenditures
in election years to become re-elected and that leftist governments will increase the growth of
public health expenditures compared to rightwing governments in order to accommodate their
clientele. The influence of minority governments and the size of a coalition government remain
to be measured empirically.
3. Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data 
I use data provided by the OECD Health Data Base (2007). The data set contains yearly
data for public HCE of 18 OECD countries. The countries included are Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA. The
observation period runs from 1970 to 2004 (in levels). The panel is mostly balanced. Figure 1
illustrates that, on average5, public HCE as a share of GDP increased from 3.6% in 1971 to 6.8%
in 2004. The USA spent much less than the average for a long time, but they spent as much as
the average in 2004. In Sweden, however, the share of public HCE on GDP was much higher
than on average. In Australia and NewZealand, public HCE strongly increased in the early1970s
and were more volatile over the entire 1971-2004 period than on average.
Figure 2 shows the shares of public expenditures on total HCE and stresses the meaning
of public HCE: the share was about 70% on average. Sweden had a veryhigh share between 80%
and 90%, while only 40% of the total HCE were public expenditures in the USA. The share of
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public expenditures in New Zealand was especially high in the 1980s. In Australia, the
government always spent somewhat less for public HCE than on OECD average. In conclusion,
the lion’s share of HCE is public, which makes this measure an important indicator.
 
3.2 The empirical model 
The dynamic panel data model has the following form:
∆log Public HCEit = Σj αj Political Variable ijt + Σk βk ∆log Xikt + γ ∆log Public HCEit-1
+ ηi + εt + uit
i = 1,…,18; j = 1,…,5; k = 1,…,7; t = 1,…,34
where the dependent variable ∆log Public HCEit denotes the growth rate of public HCE (per
capita, real terms). In the next paragraph I describe the political variables “Political Variableijt“
and their coding in detail. Σk βk ∆log Xikt contains the exogenous control variables. Since there is
no consensus about which explanatory variables should be included, I select a relatively large
number of explanatory variables in different regression specifications. I shall first consider public
HCE as a share of social expenditures. I follow the related studies on social expenditures by
including the growth rate of real GDP per capita (∆log GDPit), the growth rate of the
unemployment rate (∆log Unemploymentit), and the growth rate of the dependency ratio
measured as the share of the citizens aged above 64 and below 14 (∆log Dependency Ratioit).
Thus, the general economic situation, the situation of the labor market, and the demographic
development are taken into account. In addition, further control variables can be considered to
avoid potential omitted variable bias. For a long time, GDP was the only generally accepted
explanatory variable for the rise of total HCE (per capita). Hartwig (2008) has shown that total
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
5
 Note that there are not always data available for all the 18 countries from 1971 to 2004. I adjust the average
respectively. In anyevent, taking averages does not change the inference of the rise in public HCE.
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HCE are driven by wage increases that are larger than productivity growth. His application
requires nominal data. In comparison, I do not examine growth of total HCE but growth of
public HCE. To capture the influence of wage increases on HCE I include the growth rate of the
compensation of employees (per capita and in real terms). I include the growth rate of the sum of
private HCE (per capita and in real terms) in order to control for the interaction with the private
and the public health sector. Public HCE is also one of the functional components of
government expenditures (COFOG). Dreher et al. (2008a, 2008b), Shelton (2007), Sanz and
Velázquez (2007) and Gemmell et al. (2008) examine the composition of government
expenditure and I follow this literature to include further explanatory variables. First, I control
for total population in the individual countries which complements the dependency ratio.
Second, globalization could also influence public HCE. Therefore, I follow Dreher et al. (2008a,
2008b) and include the growth rate of the KOF index of globalization (for details see Dreher
2006b and Dreher et al. 2008b). Panel unit root tests indicate that these variables are stationary
(see appendix). ∆log Public HCEit-1 describes the lagged dependent variable. Lastly, ηi represents
a (potential) fixed country effect, εt is a temporal effect and uit describes an error term. I follow
the recommendation of the OECD not to convert variables into PPPs in international
comparisons.6
Political Variableijt is in the centre of my analysis. I distinguish between a variable
controlling for the effect of election years, the ideological party composition of the governments,
the number of coalition partners and whether the respective governments had a majority in
parliament (minoritygovernment).
The variable Electionit takes the exact timing of the elections into account. Following
Franzese (2000), it is calculated as
Electionit = [(M-1) + d/D]/12
                                                                        
6
 See Ahmad et al. (2003). 
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whereM is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days in
that month. In all other years, its values are set to zero. Therefore, I directly control for
fluctuations and the fact that the election dates differ between and in the individual countries (see
also section 4.1).
An important challenge in testing for the influence of government ideology in an OECD
panel is the heterogeneity of the parties and parliamentary systems in the various nation states.
The question is which governments should be labeled leftwing or rightwing – especially when
there are more than two parties in government with different ideological roots. I employ the
government ideology index proposed by Potrafke (2009a), which is based on the index of
governments’ ideological positions by Budge et al. (1993) and updated by Woldendorp et al.
(1998, 2000). This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. It
takes the value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in
parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3. The index is 3 if the share of
centre parties is 50%, or if the leftwing and rightwing parties form a coalition government that is
not dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if
the leftwing parties dominate. Potrafke’s (2009a) coding is consistent across time but does not
attempt to capture differences between the party-families across countries. Years in which the
government changed are labeled according to the government that was in office for the longer
period, e.g., when a rightwing government followed a leftwing government in August, this year is
labeled as leftwing. The coding of the ideology variable gives rise to the expectation that the
growth of public HCE varies positivelywith the ideologyindex.
The influence of the type of government is tested by three variables whereas previous
studies used just one. Roubini and Sachs (1989) constructed an index of power dispersion which
distinguishes between the number of coalition partners and whether the government was a
minoritygovernment. Unfortunately, this procedure mixes the quantitative aspect (the number of
parties in the coalition) with a qualitative aspect (minority versus majority government, see Edin
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andOhlsson 1991, De Haan and Sturm 1994). Therefore, I first use two variables controlling for
the number of parties in government. The variable Coalition (2 or 3 parties) assumes the value 1
for parliamentarygovernments with two or three coalition partners, and 0 otherwise. The variable
Coalition (4 or more parties) assumes the value 1 for parliamentary governments with four or
more coalition partners, and 0 otherwise.
I also include a dummy variable to control for the influence of minority governments.
The dummy variable assumes the value 1 when the government does not have a majority in
parliament, and 0 otherwise.
I now turn to discussing my choice of the panel data estimation methods. First, taking
growth rates of the dependent variable eliminates time-invariant fixed effects in levels. But in case
of different time trends in each country, taking growth rates eliminates the time-invariant country
effects, but not the individual time components. This suggests that the least squares dummy
variable estimator (fixed-effects) is used to estimate growth rates. Random effects could also be
present because I do not examine all OECD countries. In addition, I applyheteroskedasticityand
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type (Newey and West 1987, Stock and Watson
2008) standard errors and variance-covariance estimates, because the Wooldridge test
(Wooldridge 2002: 176-177) for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data
model implies the existence of arbitrary serial correlation. In the context of dynamic estimation,
the common fixed-effect estimator is biased in a short panel. The estimators taking into account
the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental estimators and a class of
direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003, for example, for a discussion). In accordance
with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) will be biased in my econometric model with N=18. For this reason, bias corrected
estimators are more appropriate. I apply Bruno’s (2005a, 2005b) bias corrected least squares
dummyvariable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N.7
                                                                        
7
 I choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in which the instruments are collapsed as
suggested by Roodman (2006). This procedure makes sure to avoid using invalid and too many instruments (see
 12
4. Results 
4.1 Basic scenario: 1971 to 2004 
Table 1 illustrates the regression results for the 1971-2004 period. I can reject the null
hypothesis of the F-Test that all the fixed time and country effects are zero. Furthermore, I
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman-Test that the difference in coefficients is not
systematic. Hence, in this case, the random effects estimator (RE) is efficient and consistent
(columns 1, 3, and 5). Columns (2), (4) and (6) refer to the model that includes a lagged
dependent variable (DYN). Table 1 reports the coefficients and t-statistics (in absolute terms) for
these six equations.
The results in Table 1 illustrate that the inclusion of different sets of control variables
does not affect the results referring to the political determinants. The control variables have the
expected signs and their influence is robust across the different econometric specifications
(columns 3 to 6). The positive elasticity of real per capita income on public HCE corroborates
that governments increase public HCE when the economy is growing. The estimated coefficients
imply that public HCE increased by about 0.4% when real per capita GDP increased by 1%. In
contrast, the growth rates of the dependencyratio and the unemployment rate do not turn out to
be statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). The regression results in columns (5) and (6)
showthat the growth rate of the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 10% and 5%
level if the growth rate of the real compensation of employees is included in the regressions. The
growth rate of the real compensation of employees enters the regressions with the expected
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the growth rate of
GDP per capita remains positive, but does not turn out to be statistically significant. The reason
is the correlation between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the growth rate of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Roodman 2006 and 2009 for further details). Following Bloom et al. (2007) I undertake 50 repetitions of the
procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Bootstrapping the standard errors is common practice
applying this estimator. The reason is that Monte Carlo simulations demonstrated that the analytical variance
estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (see Bruno 2005b for further
details). The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions such as 100, 200 or 500 or when the Arellano-
Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator.
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compensationof employees. Private HCE had the expected negative influence on public HCE,
i.e. they function as a substitute. The estimated coefficients imply that public HCE decreased by
about 0.05% when private HCE increased by1%. In contrast, the growth rate of total population
and the growth rate of the KOF index of globalization do not turn out to be statistically
significant which indicates that globalization does not have a negative influence on the welfare
state. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and the coefficient
reveals an elasticityof about 0.18.
The results show that policy influenced the growth of public HCE over the 1971-2004
period. All the specifications report a positive and statistically significant influence of the election
year variable. The effect is somewhat weaker when further control variables are used. The results
in Table 1 thus provide strong evidence for an electoral cycle: politicians increased the growth of
public health spending in election years in the 1971-2004 period, and thus, behaved
opportunistically. Numerically, the regression results suggest that the growth rate of public HCE
increased byabout 2% in election years.
Government ideology did not influence the growth of public HCE in the 1971-2004
period. The coefficients of the government ideology variable have the expected positive sign but
do not turn out to be statistically significant. Moreover, the results suggest that coalition
governments did not influence the growth of public HCE (the coefficient of the coalition type
dummy 4 or more parties is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 5, however).
Minoritygovernments also did not influence the growth of public HCE.
The electoral effects may depend on whether elections were part of the regular electoral
cycle or whether they were irregular (early). Shi and Svensson (2006) examine political budget
cycles and point out that the election timing might be endogenous. But according to Brender and
Drazen (2005), there are two conceptual problems with Shi and Svensson’s (2006) presumption.
First, it is not easy to distinguish between systems in which electoral dates are fixed and systems
where earlyelections maybe called. In the same manner, earlyelections seem to be the rule rather
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than the exception. Furthermore, there are countries in which the government may call early
elections, but rarely does so. Second, “there is no clear theoretical presumption about whether
fiscal manipulation will be stronger or weaker when election dates are effectively predetermined”
(Brender and Drazen 2005: 1282). In any event, distinguishing between regular and irregular
elections appears to be reasonable. To follow up this idea, I use Shi and Svensson’s (2006) data
on regular and early election years from 1975 to 19958 and extend the respective data from 1971
to 19749 and from 1996 to 2004 using several volumes of the Political Handbooks and following
Shi and Svensson’s (2006: 1374) identification strategy. An election date is classified as regular if
either (i) the election is held on the fixed date (year) specified by the constitution; or (ii) the
election occurs in the last year of a constitutionally fixed term for the legislature; or (iii) the
election is announced at least a year in advance. Overall, I identify 63.8% of the election dates as
regular.
Table 2 points out that the growth of public HCE increased strongly when elections were
early. The coefficient of the regular election year variable remains positive, but does not turn out
to be statistically significant at conventional significance levels. In general, early elections are
called in uncertain and polarized political circumstances. In contrast to fiscal policy, the
endogeneity argument does not appear to apply in health policy. It is implausible that early
elections are called exactly because of contested public health policies. In fact, one expects high
polarization between two competing political blocks when early elections are called and
incumbents are likely to implement expansionary public health policies to get re-elected.
Therefore, I interpret the findings reported in Table 2 to strongly support the electoral cycle
hypothesis.
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 I thank Min Shi and Jakob Svensson for providing their data. 
9
 Even the Political Handbook from 1976 does not exactly identify the general elections in Finland and Japan 1972 as
well as the election in Canada in 1974 as early. Theyare highlyexpected to be early, but theoretically, theycould have
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4.2 Different policy periods: the 1970s and 1980s versus the 1990s 
The influence of political determinants may well change across time which implies that
one should analyze specific time periods seperately. Beginning with Kittel and Obinger (2003),
panel regressions were conducted with relatively short samples. This strategy is motivated by the
momentous historical events in the 1971-2004 period. In 1990, the “Iron Curtain” fell. Garrett
(1998: 1) believes that “…one should be recitent to conclude differently about the 1990s because
of the highly idiosyncratic nature of the decade in Europe”. Most of the European economies
went into a recession after 1989. In Germany, interest rates increased sharplyas a consequence of
the German Unification. This slowed down economic activity throughout the continent –
especially in the countries whose currencies were pegged to the Deutsche Mark. Finland and
Sweden, for example, decided to peg their exchange rates to the Deutsche Mark and had
recessions and high unemployment in the early 1990s. The 1991 Gulf War added further
instability and uncertainty to global markets. I followthe strategy of treating the 34 years covered
in my basic scenario as two distinct historical periods and distinguish between the sub-periods
1971-1990 and 1991-2004.10 To address this issue, I have included a “Post-Soviet” dummy
variable that takes on the value zero in the 1971-1990 period and one in the 1991-2004 period.
Moreover, I include the interaction of the political variables and this “Post-Soviet” dummy in
order to identify potential differences of the political determinants before and after the fall of the
Iron Curtain. I normalize (mean zero, variance one) the political variables and “Post-Soviet”
dummybefore interacting. Including the “Post-Soviet” dummyvariable requires excluding one of
the temporal effect variables. Table 3 reports the regression results and indicates again that
random effects are more appropriate than fixed countryeffects.
As can be seen from Table 3, the coefficients of the election variable still have a positive
sign and the government ideology variable still lacks statistical significance. The coefficients of
the interaction terms between the government ideology variable and the “Post-Soviet” dummy
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
been announced one year in advance. Then I would have to label them as regular. However, this would not affect my
inferences.
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havea negative sign but are statistically significant only at the 5% level in columns (3) and (5).
The government ideology variables and the interaction terms do not turn out to be statistically
significant when the lagged dependent variable is included (columns 2, 4 and 6) as well as in
column (1). The coefficients of the interaction terms between the coalition type (4 or more
parties) variable and the “Post-Soviet” dummyhave a negative sign and are statisticallysignificant
at the 5% level in columns (1) and (3) and at the 10% level in columns (4) and (5). The marginal
effects of the political variables have to be interpreted conditionally on the interaction with the
“Post-Soviet” dummy (see Friedrich 1982). In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate
the marginal effects. I followDreher and Gassebner (2007), evaluating the marginal effects at the
minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e., the “Post-Soviet” dummy
(Table 4). Using this method one can distinguish between the impacts of the political variables on
the growth of public HCE before and after communism collapsed. If one chooses to evaluate the
marginal effects at the average level of the “Post-Soviet” dummy, the statistical significance of
these average effects corresponds to the respective t-statistics of the political variables in Table 3.
The results in Table 4 suggest that policy changed slightly in the aftermath of the fall of
the Iron Curtain. Electoral cycles in the growth of public HCE mainlyoccurred in the 1971-1990
period. The marginal effects of the election year variables do not turn out to be statistically
significant in the 1991-2004 period. The ideological orientation of the government appears to
have very slightly changed: the coefficients of the Ideology variable are positive in the 1971-1990
period but are only statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (3) and (5). The
coefficients mostly have negative signs in the 1991-2004 period but only the coefficient in
column (5) is statistically significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, regarding the type of
government variables, the results demonstrate that more encompassing coalitions did not
decrease spending in the 1971-1990 period but somewhat in the 1991-2004 period. The marginal
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1), (3) and (5). I interpret this effect to
mean that more encompassing coalitions are expected to have broader majorities in parliament
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 The conclusions also hold when I consider the sub-periods 1971 to 1989 and 1990 to 2004.
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and therefore were in a position to decrease the growth of public HCE and conduct more
responsible economic policies. The effects tell us that a coalition consisting of 4 or more parties
decreased the growth rate of public HCE by about 0.8% compared to a single party government
in the 1991-2004 period.
Overall, the results for the 1971-1990 and for the 1991-2004 periods suggest that small
policy shifts occurred in the observation period. In this respect, my results accord with the
evidence provided by the related literature on social expenditures. It is important to note,
however, that the analysis does not take into account that party ideologies may have changed.11
Overall, the results seem to be in accordance with the claim that health is a special good in the
sense that government ideologyhardlymatters in providing public health care.
 
4.3 Further robustness tests and discussion 
The results derived from the different model specifications indicate that the reported
political effects are robust, i.e. they are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular
explanatory variables. In line with the related literature, the dependency ratio did not turn out to
be significant.12 In further specifications (not shown), I use the share of the population aged 65
and above (old age population) and the share of the population aged 15 and belowinstead of the
dependencyratio (Shelton 2007). Both variables have a negative influence on public HCE, but do
not change the political effects at all. Alternatively, I include the old age population in thousands,
not as a share. This specification does not change the inferences regarding the political variables.
I also replace the KOF index of globalization by trade-openness. Trade-openness does not turn
out to be statistically significant and the political effects remain unchanged. Using the economic,
                                                                        
11
 Potrafke (2009b) developed a dynamic index of voter polarization and uses German data to illustrate the concept.
If it were possible to construct such a dynamic index for all OECD countries, one could evaluate in more depth
whether the growth of public HCE was not induced bygovernment ideology. 
12 The demographic change just started in the considered 1971-2004 period. Hence the regression result does not
necessarily implythat the increasing share of older people does not give rise to higher public HCE.
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socialand political KOF sub indices of globalization instead of the overall index does not change
the conclusions either.
To control for contemporaneous correlation across the countries I applied panel
corrected standard errors according to Beck and Katz (1995, 1996). Results do not change at all
when panel corrected standard errors are applied.
The reported effects could depend on idiosyncratic circumstances in individual countries.
I therefore test whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries.
This kind of sensitivity analysis also highlights the historical background and hence provides
further interesting insights. The results concerning electoral cycles in public HCE are not driven
by the inclusion of one specific individual country. Excluding Australia, however, strongly
reduces the influence of the election year variable. In some specifications, it even fails statistical
significance at the 10% level. The t-statistic of the Ideology variable also dramatically decreases
when Australia is excluded. This finding is perfectly in line with evidence from case studies:
DeVoe’s (2003) case study of the 1973 Australian Community Health Program (CHP) illustrates
that health has indeed been a very political issue in Australia. She states that “in the 1969 and
1972 federal elections, a revitalized Australia Labor Party (ALP), led by Gough Whitlam and
focused on social and political change, began to talk seriously about health care reform…Soon
after the ALP victory in 1972, community health advocates outlined the CHP as a way to
“expand and co-ordinate communityhealth services” and to give grants in support of “alternative
methods of delivering health care” ” (DeVoe 2003: 78 f.). Considering the last decades in general,
“the center of gravityhas shifted back and forth between the public and private sectors as control
of the commonwealth (federal) government has alternated between Labour and Coalition (right-
of-center) parties” (Tuohy et al. 2004: 368). Public health was also an important issue in election
campaigns. DeVoe (2003: 93 f.): “By October 1969, an Australian Gallup poll reported that 54%
of Australians polled preferred the Labor Party proposal for a “free” system of basic medical and
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hospital care with a compulsory levy, compared with only 37.6% who preferred the Liberal
Party’s voluntaryhealth insurance schemes.”
Excluding Portugal turns the Ideologyvariable statisticallysignificant at the 10% level and
thus implies that rightwing governments increased the growth of public HCE in Portugal. In
Portugal, however, overall social expenditures were for a long time belowthe Southern European
average. In 1984, the conservative government reorganized social protection and the anti-poverty
policies received a boost after Portugal entered the EU in 1986: in the 1986-1995 period, not only
public HCE dramatically increased but overall social expenditures increased from 11.8% to
18.1% as a share of GDP under a rightwing government (see Capucha et al. 2006).
Countries such as the UK and the USA neither impair nor strengthen the econometric
results. At first glance, this might be surprising since the governments lead by Margret Thatcher
and Ronald Reagan are well known for their free market policies (Thatcherism and
Reaganomics). But in the UK, support for the public provision of health care (and retirement
pensions) run high across all social sectors at the end of the 1980s: 85% of all professionals and
managers and 87% of unskilled workers believed that the government should bear responsibility
for health care. Therefore, a slight reduction of public expenditure in that area could only be
accomplished at high electoral costs. The conservative Thatcher government stressed the need to
keep medical care universal and free. As a result, public health expenditures went up under the
Thatcher government by about 35% in real terms, higher than the total increase in GDP (Boix
1998: 192-194). After overall public spending had increased in the course of the recession at the
beginning of the 1980s, these rightwing governments in the UK and USA eventually curbed
social transfers and cut public spending on capital formation and industrial subsidies. However,
spending for social affairs was not reduced. “Strict electoral calculations partially explain the
Conservatives’ conscious rejection of any substantial reduction in core welfare programs to
achieve their overall goal of lower public expenditure. Popular support for the welfare state was
just too strong” (Boix 1998: 192).
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5. Conclusion 
Incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public health
expenditures in election years in OECD countries in the 1971-2004 period, whereas government
ideology did not influence the growth of public health expenditures in this period. This finding is
in line with the related empirical literature that ideology did not affect budgetary affairs in the last
two decades, but ideology-induced effects can be identified in non-budgetary affairs. For
example, market-oriented governments have deregulated product markets in OECD countries in
the 1980-2003 period (Potrafke 2010), and government ideology has had a strong influence on
political alignment with the U.S.: leftwing governments were less sympathetic to US positions
(Potrafke 2009c). The distinctly different alignments of leftist and rightwing governments with
the U.S. reflect sources of ideological association that transcend issues of economic policy.
The demographic change will have a distinct influence on health policies in the future.
Political economic models have not really dealt with this novel phenomenon so far. A more
encompassing theory is required to portray how electoral motives and government ideology
influence public health policy in the course of demographic change. In most OECD countries,
the number of pensioners and thus of people who receive benefits from the public health system
increases while the number of younger citizens who pay contributions to the public health
systems decreases. Leftwing and rightwing parties need to adjust their policy platforms to the
demographic change, and the public health systems in OECD countries need to be reformed to
remain sustainable. A prime question will be, whether leftwing and rightwing political parties will
offer different policyplatforms on redistribution and deductibles in the public health system.
Health care reforms, however, require majorities in the electorate. Pensioners and people
who receive benefits from the public health system are not likely to vote for reforms that
decrease their own benefits (although the old generation cannot extort the young generation
boundlessly, see Breyer and Stolte 2001 on the feasibility of pension reform). A second and yet
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openquestion is whether pensioners and benefit recipients would be willing to forgo benefits in
favor of keeping public health systems financiallyaffordable.
Public health has been an important topic in the public debate and in election campaigns.
In the 2008 US election campaign, for example, a significant aspect of Barack Obama’s platform
was to propose a compulsory health insurance system. In the first one and a half years after his
election, Obama has however not had sufficient support in his own democratic party to
introduce a compulsory health insurance system. In Germany, reforms of the public health
system were intensively debated before the federal elections in 2005 and 2009. These examples
nicely illustrate myfindings: (1) the importance of public health in policydebates before elections
and (2) the political pressure towards re-organizing public health policyplatforms.
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Appendix: panel unit root tests 
Inorder to test for stationarityof the time series, I applya batteryof panel unit root tests.
The advantage of the panel unit root tests compared to the univariate counterparts is their greater
statistical power. However, the tests to a panel also relate to asymptotic theory and therefore
loose power in small samples. Breitung and Pesaran’s (2008) overview on unit roots and
cointegration in panels points out that the respective tests refer to samples where the time
dimension (T) and the cross section dimension (N) are relatively large. As is common in the
literature on HCE, however, I carefully apply the battery of respective tests. First, I test whether
the time series are cross-section independent (see, for example, Pesaran 2004 and Ng 2006). I
apply Pesaran’s (2004), Frees (1995) and Friedman’s (1937) test statistics using STATA 10 (see
De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). The test statistics provide mixed results on whether cross section
dependence is present or not. Therefore, I apply first generation panel unit root tests that do not
take into account cross section dependence. Moreover, I apply Pesaran’s (2007) second
generation panel unit root test that does take into account cross section dependence.
The following tables report the results of the panel unit root tests on the public HCE (per
capita) and the tests on the respective series of GDP per capita, unemployment, the dependency
ratio, compensation of employees, private health care expenditures per capita, the KOF index of
globalization and total population. They refer to the test on the growth rates because I use the
variables in growth rates in the econometric model. I applied the Levin et al. (2002), Im et al.
(2003) and the Fisher tests referring to Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) tests. The results
were obtained using Eviews 5.1. Unlike STATA 10, Eviews 5.1. allows the application of the
respective tests on unbalanced panels; it considers an automatic lag length selection by using
Information Criteria, and also contains the Breitung (2000) test. Regarding the first three tests
listed in the table, maximum lag lengths are automatically selected based on the Schwarz
Information Criterion. The remaining two tests use the Bartlett kernel for the Newey-West
bandwidth selection. The probabilities for the Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality (See Hartwig 2008: Appendix).
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The results of the Pesaran (2007) test were obtained using STATA 10 and refer to test
regressions in which I included one lag. The inferences do not change at all when I include more
lags in the test regression. The test regressions in growth rates include a constant but no linear
deterministic trend.
Table 5: Results of the panel unit root tests. Public HCE, GDP and unemployment
log(public HCE) log(GDP) log(unemployment)
Ho: Unit root in first diff. Stat. Prob. Obs. Stat. Prob. Obs. Stat. Prob. Obs.
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.228 0.000 569 -12.634 0.000 626 -11.664 0.000 601
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat -12.339 0.000 569 -12.900 0.000 626 -14.281 0.000 601
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 213.130 0.000 569 226.319 0.000 626 256.242 0.000 601
PP-Fisher Chi-square 213.917 0.000 580 238.900 0.000 627 232.198 0.000 607
Pesaran -7.593 0.000 561 -7.995 0.000 592 -9.234 0.000 576
log(public HCE) = log of public HCE per capita, log(GDP) = log of GDP per capita,
log(unemployment) = log of unemployment rate
Table 6: Results of the panel unit root tests. Dependency ratio, compensation of employees,
private HCE
log(dependency_ratio) log(comp_employees) log(private HCE)
Ho: Unit root in first diff. Stat. Prob. Obs. Stat. Prob. Obs. Stat. Prob. Obs.
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.491 0.068 616 -11.180 0.000 595 -14.304 0.000 593
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat -1.610 0.054 616 -11.428 0.000 595 -15.698 0.000 593
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 41.305 0.250 616 196.266 0.000 595 288.938 0.000 593
PP-Fisher Chi-square 37.856 0.387 616 187.375 0.000 598 330.776 0.000 601
Pesaran -0.802 0.206 582 -9.689 0.000 578 -10.479 0.000 571
log(dependency_ratio) = log of the dependency ratio, log(comp_employees) = log of compensation of employees,
log(private HCE) = log of private HCE per capita
Table 7: Results of the panel unit root tests. Population and KOF index of globalization
log(population) log(IOG)
Ho: Unit root in first diff. Stat. Prob. Obs. Stat. Prob. Obs.
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.764 0.001 628 -19.369 0.000 593
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat -6.715 0.000 628 -18.897 0.000 593
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 123.386 0.000 628 340.025 0.000 593
PP-Fisher Chi-square 113.297 0.000 628 350.362 0.000 593
Pesaran -5.359 0.000 593 -9.363 0.000 576
log(population) = log of (total) population, log(IOG) = log of the KOF index of globalization
Tables 5-7 report the results of different unit root tests and demonstrate that we can always reject
the null hypotheses of a unit root in growth rates except for the dependency ratio. Overall, I
conclude from these tests that the panel data in growth rates are stationary.
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Figure1: Public HCE in relation to GDP. 1971-2004. 
(average of the 18 countries, Australia, NewZealand, Sweden and the USA)
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Figure 2: Public in relation to total HCE. 1971-2004. 
(average of the 18 countries, Australia, NewZealand, Sweden and the USA)
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Table 1. Regression Results. 1971-2004. Dependent Variable: ∆log Public HCE (per capita). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE DYN RE DYN RE DYN
Election 0.0210*** 0.0226*** 0.0183** 0.0196*** 0.0138* 0.0173**
[2.63] [3.07] [2.31] [2.87] [1.77] [2.13]
Ideology 0.0026 0.0014 0.0028 0.0019 0.0014 0.0013
[1.15] [0.43] [1.21] [0.68] [0.66] [0.53]
Coalition (2 or 3 parties) -0.0022 -0.0052 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0003 0.0011
[0.36] [0.72] [0.13] [0.21] [0.08] [0.17]
Coalition (4 or more parties) -0.0071 -0.0039 -0.0048 0.0018 -0.0102* 0.0055
[0.92] [0.29] [0.57] [0.14] [1.71] [0.40]
MinorityGovernment -0.0011 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0057 -0.0008 -0.0015
[0.15] [0.49] [0.53] [0.67] [0.16] [0.18]
∆log GDP (per capita) 0.4702*** 0.3804** 0.2293 0.061
[3.44] [2.50] [1.60] [0.42]
∆log DependencyRatio -0.0071 0.0614 0.0158 0.1215
[0.04] [0.25] [0.09] [0.49]
∆log Unemployment 0.0039 0.0102 0.0267* 0.0276**
[0.25] [0.77] [1.75] [2.13]
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.1854*** 0.1785*** 0.1702***
[4.03] [3.78] [3.68]
∆log Comp. of Employees 0.5385*** 0.5229***
[4.15] [5.80]
∆log Private HCE -0.0469* -0.0511***
[1.83] [4.17]
∆log Population 0.1612 0.1324
[0.41] [0.21]
∆log Index of Globalization -0.0423 -0.0304
[0.59] [0.39]
Fixed CountryEffects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Temporal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 588 571 579 564 578 563
R-squared 0.20 0.24 0.31
Number of n 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors.
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Table 2. Regression Results. 1971-2004. Dependent Variable: ∆log Public HCE (per capita). Regular and early 
elections. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE DYN RE DYN RE DYN
Election (regular) 0.0154 0.0145 0.0116 0.0108 0.0088 0.0077
[1.57] [1.61] [1.22] [1.24] [0.98] [0.81]
Election (early) 0.0302** 0.0354*** 0.0295** 0.0339*** 0.0219* 0.0330***
[2.45] [3.04] [2.34] [3.23] [1.76] [3.42]
Ideology 0.0026 0.0012 0.0028 0.0017 0.0015 0.0011
[1.14] [0.37] [1.21] [0.61] [0.70] [0.45]
Coalition (2 or 3 parties) -0.0030 -0.0063 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0006 -0.0001
[0.47] [0.91] [0.24] [0.37] [0.14] [0.02]
Coalition (4 or more parties) -0.0066 -0.0038 -0.0038 0.0022 -0.0099* 0.0058
[0.85] [0.28] [0.45] [0.17] [1.66] [0.43]
MinorityGovernment -0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0053 -0.0079 -0.0014 -0.0038
[0.29] [0.71] [0.71] [0.96] [0.26] [0.46]
∆log GDP (per capita) 0.4720*** 0.3923** 0.2357 0.0745
[3.41] [2.58] [1.64] [0.52]
∆log DependencyRatio -0.0162 0.0530 0.0107 0.1089
[0.08] [0.22] [0.06] [0.45]
∆log Unemployment 0.0042 0.0111 0.0273* 0.0286**
[0.27] [0.84] [1.80] [2.20]
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.1894*** 0.1821*** 0.1742***
[4.16] [3.82] [3.81]
∆log Comp. of Employees 0.5380*** 0.5229***
[4.15] [5.81]
∆log Private HCE -0.0470* -0.0521***
[1.84] [4.26]
∆log Population 0.1713 0.1669
[0.43] [0.27]
∆log Index of Globalization -0.0441 -0.0345
[0.61] [0.44]
Fixed CountryEffects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Temporal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 588 571 579 564 578 563
R-squared 0.20 0.24 0.31
Number of n 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors.
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Table 3. Regression Results. 1971-2004. Dependent Variable: ∆log Public HCE (per capita). Post-Soviet policy changes. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE DYN RE DYN RE DYN
Election 0.0064*** 0.0069*** 0.0047* 0.0059*** 0.0041* 0.0052**
[2.66] [2.98] [1.95] [2.76] [1.76] [2.05]
Ideology 0.002 0.0009 0.0015 0.0014 0.0010 0.0010
[0.98] [0.31] [0.75] [0.55] [0.49] [0.44]
Coalition (2 or 3 parties) -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0008 0.0001
[0.56] [0.88] [0.27] [0.36] [0.35] [0.04]
Coalition (4 or more parties) -0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0032* 0.0002 -0.0034** 0.0012
[1.29] [0.43] [1.79] [0.06] [2.08] [0.32]
MinorityGovernment -0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0009
[0.27] [0.67] [0.55] [0.78] [0.27] [0.23]
Post-Soviet Dummy -0.0186* -0.0262*** -0.0133 -0.0232** -0.0062 -0.0157*
[1.75] [2.63] [1.29] [2.30] [0.60] [1.91]
Election*
Post-Soviet Dummy -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0023
[1.08] [1.36] [1.08] [1.57] [0.71] [1.23]
Ideology*
Post-Soviet Dummy -0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0042** -0.0024 -0.0047** -0.0033
[1.57] [0.73] [2.18] [0.99] [2.53] [1.36]
Coalition (2 or 3 parties)*
Post-Soviet Dummy 0.0006 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0013 1×10-5
[0.27] [0.55] [0.18] [0.41] [0.60] [0.01]
Coalition (4 or more parties)
*Post-Soviet Dummy -0.0038** -0.0030 -0.0039** -0.0031* -0.0031* -0.0024
[2.08] [1.31] [2.05] [1.70] [1.89] [1.21]
MinorityGovernment*
Post-Soviet Dummy 0.0031 0.0028 0.0030 0.0027 0.0027 0.0023
[1.49] [1.33] [1.39] [1.24] [1.24] [1.11]
∆log GDP (per capita) 0.5987*** 0.3856** 0.2387* 0.0763
[4.59] [2.55] [1.67] [0.52]
∆log DependencyRatio 0.1049 0.0965 0.1142 0.1859
[0.55] [0.39] [0.64] [0.75]
∆log Unemployment 0.0108 0.0117 0.0270* 0.0283**
[0.68] [0.88] [1.76] [2.10]
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.1825*** 0.1735*** 0.1658***
[4.03] [3.68] [3.62]
∆log Comp. of Employees 0.5304*** 0.5146***
[4.11] [5.52]
∆log Private HCE -0.0462* -0.0503***
[1.79] [4.02]
∆log Population 0.1134 0.0278
[0.29] [0.04]
∆log Index of Globalization -0.0500 -0.0343
[0.70] [0.44]
Fixed CountryEffects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Temporal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 588 571 579 564 578 563
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.32
Number of n 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors.
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Table 4. Marginal Effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE DYN RE DYN RE DYN
Election 1971-1990 0.008** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.006* 0.007***
[2.50] [3.54] [2.01] [3.65] [1.68] [2.69]
Average 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005* 0.006*** 0.004* 0.005**
[2.66] [2.98] [1.95] [2.76] [1.76] [2.05]
1991-2004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[1.08] [0.87] [0.53] [0.67] [0.66] [0.66]
Ideology 1971-1990 0.005 0.002 0.005* 0.003 0.005* 0.004
[1.54] [0.62] [1.76] [1.01] [1.77] [1.29]
Average 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.98] [0.31] [0.75] [0.55] [0.49] [0.44]
1991-2004 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005* -0.003
[0.60] [0.25] [1.31] [0.37] [1.80] [0.76]
Coalition
(2 or 3 parties) 1971-1990 -0.002 -0.004 -2×10
-4 -0.002 3×10-4 1×10-4
[0.53] [1.00] [0.08] [0.53] [0.08] [0.03]
Average -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1×10-4
[0.56] [0.88] [0.27] [0.36] [0.35] [0.04]
1991-2004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1×10-4 -0.002 1×10-4
[0.35] [0.33] [0.41] [0.02] [0.87] [0.04]
Coalition
(4 or more parties) 1971-1990 5×10
-4 0.001 7×10-5 -0.003 -7×10-4 0.003
[0.22] [0.21] [0.04] [0.80] [0.41] [0.80]
Average -0.003 -0.002 -0.003* 2×10-4 -0.003** 0.001
[1.29] [0.43] [1.79] [0.06] [2.08] [0.32]
1991-2004 -0.007** -0.005 -0.008** -0.003 -0.007** -0.002
[2.06] [1.13] [2.34] [0.76] [2.43] [0.36]
Minority
Government 1971-1990 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
[0.85] [1.26] [1.06] [1.14] [0.83] [0.66]
Average -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[0.27] [0.67] [0.55] [0.78] [0.27] [0.23]
1991-2004 0.003 0.001 0.002 5×10-5 0.003 0.002
[0.95] [0.26] [0.92] [0.01] [0.95] [0.43]
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets (absolute values); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
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AppendixTable A1. Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Source
Public HCE
(per capita)
619 18437.21 48549.44 72 270994 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
Election 619 0.17 0.30 0 0.967 Own Calculation
Election (regular) 619 0.11 0.25 0 0.952 Shi and Svensson (2006)/
Own Calculation
Election (irregular) 619 0.06 0.21 0 0.967 Shi and Svensson (2006)/
Own Calculation
Ideology 617 2.86 0.92 1 4 Potrafke (2009a)
Coalition (2 or 3 parties) 630 0.42 0.49 0 1 Own Calculation
Coalition (4 or more parties) 630 0.08 0.27 0 1 Own Calculation
MinorityGovernment 616 0.24 0.43 0 1 Own Calculation
GDP
(real terms, per capita,
local currencies)
629 328307.90 822872.10 4647.21 4104613 Worldbank (2007)
Dependencyratio 619 52.66 5.97 42.6 73.5 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
Unemployment rate 615 5.84 4.12 0.1 23.9 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
Comp. of Employees 629 170817.80 434028.20 2382 2145271 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
Private HCE 618 4690.30 12094.43 37.80042 60617.99 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
Population 629 35399.85 59860.66 205 293657 OECD Health Data Base
(2007)
KOF index
of (overall) globalization
630 68.06 13.41 33.98 91.99 KOF – Swiss Economic
Institute,
Dreher (2006b)
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Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Publichealth care
expenditures
Public expenditure on health
Public current expenditure on health
Public investment on medical facilities
Public expenditure on
• personal health care
• medical services
• curative and rehabilitative care
• long-term nursing care
• ancillaryservices
• services not allocated byfunction
• in-patient care
• curative and rehabilitative in-patient care
• long-term nursing in-patient care
• daycare
• curative and rehabilitative daycare
• long-term nursing daycare
• out-patient care
• physician services
• dental services
• (all other public expenditure on out-patient care)
• home health care
• curative and rehabilitative home care
• long-term nursing home care
• ancillaryservices
• clinical laboratory
• diagnostic imaging
• patient transport and emergencyrescue
• (All other public miscellaneous ancillaryservices)
• medical goods
• pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables
• prescription medicines
• over-the-counter medicines
• other public medical non-durables
• therapeutic appliances and other medical durables
• collective health care
• prevention and public health
• health administration and insurance
• preventive-curative health care
• health R&D
• long term care
• current health and LTC expenditure
• social services of LTC
• hospitals’ services
• services of nursing and residential care facilities
• services of ambulatoryhealth care providers
• (for) retail sale and other providers of medical goods
• services of public health organisations
• services of public health administration
• health services of other industries
per capita, constant prices, national currencies
OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
Gross domestic
product (per capita)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided bymidyear
population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value
added byall resident producers in the economyplus any product
taxes and minus anysubsidies not included in the value of the
Worldbank (2007)
 38
 products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources. Data are in constant local currency.
Unemployment Rate Total unemployment, % of labor force OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
DependencyRatio Population ages 15 to 64 is the percentage of the total population
that is in the age group 15 to 64.
OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
Compensation of
Employees
The total remuneration in cash, or in kind, payable by enterprises to
employees in return for work done by the latter during the
accounting period (this includes contributions, paid or imputed, in
respect of their employees to social security schemes and to private
pension, family allowance, casualty insurance, life insurance and
similar schemes).
per capita, NCU at 2000 GDP price level
OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
Private health care
expenditures
Private expenditure on health
Private current expenditure on health
Private investment on medical facilities
Private expenditure on
• personal health care
• medical services
• curative and rehabilitative care
• long-term nursing care
• ancillaryservices
• services not allocated byfunction
• in-patient care
• curative and rehabilitative in-patient care
• long-term nursing in-patient care
• daycare
• curative and rehabilitative daycare
• long-term nursing daycare
• out-patient care
• physician services
• dental services
• (all other Private expenditure on out-patient care)
• home health care
• curative and rehabilitative home care
• long-term nursing home care
• ancillaryservices
• medical goods
• pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables
• prescription medicines
• over-the-counter medicines
• other Private medical non-durables
• therapeutic appliances and other medical durables
• collective health care
• prevention and public health
• health administration and insurance
• preventive-curative health care
• long term care
• current health and LTC expenditure
• social services of LTC
• hospitals’ services
• services of nursing and residential care facilites
• services of ambulatoryhealth care providers
• (for) retail sale and other providers of medical goods
• services of Private health organisations
• services of Private health administration
OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
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 • health services of other industries
per capita, constant prices, national currencies
Population Total population (in thousands) OECD Health
Data Base (2007)
KOF Index of
Globalization
The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (see
Dreher, 2006a). The overall index covers the economic, social and
political dimensions of globalization. It defines globalization to be
the process of creating networks of connections among actors at
multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows
including people, information and ideas, capital and goods.
Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national
boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies
and governance and produces complex relations of mutual
interdependence.
More specifically, the three dimensions of the KOF index are
defined as:
♦ economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods,
capital and services as well as information and perceptions that
accompanymarket exchanges;
♦ political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government
policies; and
♦ social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information,
images and people.
Dreher (2006b),
Dreher et al.
(2008b)
